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T
he housing market crisis is the latest reminder that
asset prices can and do run wild at rates capable of
negative effects on real economic activity. Not sur-
prisingly, this has reinvigorated debate over whether central
banks should respond to asset price bubbles. Economists’
views on this subject are divided. Some argue that the central
bank should react to asset price misalignments (see, for
example, Cecchetti, Genberg, and Wadhwani, 2002). Those
opposed to this idea say that monetary policy focused
exclusively on stable inflation achieves better long-run
outcomes (see Bernanke and Gertler, 2001).
The volatility and unpredictability of asset prices are
well-known problems. As Mishkin (2007) notes, however,
there are assumptions under which monetary policy could
be effective in responding to asset price bubbles. First, the
central bank must be able to identify that a bubble truly
exists, which is a strong assumption since no rule exists to
assess the presence of a bubble. Hindsight is 20/20, and
some episodes that at first look like bubbles in retrospect
are not.
Second, the central bank must
apply the right policy to deflate the
bubble. This is not as straightforward
as it seems. Bubbles are episodes in
which people do not behave in a
predictable way. Thus, predicting
the consequences of an interest rate
increase is difficult. The question is
whether no action is better than the
wrong action. For example, a central
bank response that increases interest
rates but results in a recession when
no bubble was present is clearly not
desirable.
Selecting the correct policy
response is further complicated by
the difficulty in identifying a clear
pattern between monetary policy
and asset prices across countries.
The chart uses deviations from the
Taylor rule to plot the relationship among real house prices,
real stock prices, and the monetary stance for 20 industrial-
ized countries.1 Countries on the upper half of the figure
had larger increases in asset prices than the rest of the sam-
ple during the recent bubble. Countries on the left-most
side practiced looser monetary policies with respect to the
Taylor rule. Interestingly, more than half of the countries
implemented tighter monetary policy but had higher hous-
ing price increases than the United States (these are plotted
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400above and to the right of the United States). Most countries
practiced tighter monetary policy and saw higher stock
price increases than the United States.
The solid black trend line suggests that looser monetary
policy is associated with higher housing prices, but this
relationship is weak. The pattern is less clear for stock prices
(dashed blue line). This suggests that even if the central
bank could identify a bubble and apply the best policy, it
might not be able to deflate the bubble if the link between
interest rates and asset prices is weak. ■
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1 The Taylor rule says that if gross domestic product (GDP) is in line with the
economy’s potential output and inflation is equal to the central bank’s target, then
interest rates will be at a neutral level and the economy will neither accelerate nor
decelerate. If GDP grows above the economy’s potential output, or if inflation is
higher than the central bank target, then interest rates will be above the neutral
level. The effect of below-capacity GDP or below-target inflation is symmetric
but opposite. 
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